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Are Current Owners and Usufructuaries of
Polish Real Estate Nationalized after World
War II Entitled to the Status of Parties to
Reprivatization Proceedings?
PRZEMYSŁAW SZYMCZYK ∗
0F

In a Polish proceeding seeking a finding of the invalidity of a
nationalization decision issued under the Warsaw Decree, 1 the
Agricultural Reform Decree, 2 the Nationalization of Industry Act, 3 or
other nationalization regulations, one of the basic determinations that
must be made by the administrative body is the identities of the parties to
the proceeding. In the administrative practice and the case law of the
courts, there is a noticeable discrepancy between the positions on the
treatment of current owners and perpetual usufructuaries of oncenationalized properties as parties to such reprivatization proceedings—
particularly with respect to the owners of units within buildings located
on the land in question.
Under the first position, the only parties to the reprivatization
proceedings are the former owners of the real estate (or their legal
successors) and possibly the State Treasury or local governmental unit
(most often the commune—gmina). According to the second position, in
addition to the former owner or legal successor, anyone who holds
1F

2F

3F

∗ Dr. Przemysław Szymczyk is an advocate at Wardyński & Partners in Warsaw, Poland. He
specializes in real estate law.
1. Dekret z dnia 26 października 1945 r. o własności i użytkowaniu gruntów na obszarze m.
st. Warszawy [Decree on Ownership and Use of Land in the Territory of the City of Warsaw of
October 26, 1945] (Dz. U. 1945 nr 50 poz. 279) (Pol.).
2. Dekret Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia Narodowego z dnia 6 września 1944 r. o
przeprowadzeniu reformy rolnej [Decree of the Polish Committee of National Liberation on
Conduct of Agricultural Reform of September 6, 1944] (Dz. U. 1945 nr 3 poz. 13 t.j.) (Pol.).
3. Ustawa z dnia 3 stycznia 1946 r. o przejęciu na własność Państwa podstawowych gałęzi
gospodarki narodowej [Act on Assumption of Ownership by the State of Fundamental Branches of
the National Economy of January 3, 1946] (Dz. U. 1946 nr 3 poz. 17) (Pol.).
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property rights to the real estate is a party to the proceeding, including the
current owners or perpetual usufructuaries of the real estate.
This article seeks to demonstrate that the latter position is erroneous.
The rights of current owners and perpetual usufructuaries are duly
protected by law on the basis of the warranty of public reliance on the
land and mortgage register. Thus, they have no legal interest in being a
party to reprivatization proceedings and there is no need to summon them
to participate in such proceedings. Moreover, that approach often results
in conducting proceedings with dozens or even hundreds of parties,
defeating any notion of efficient adjudication and unnecessarily
prolonging the proceedings. In many instances, this approach precludes
any real possibility of carrying the proceedings through to completion
(due to inheritance matters, ownership changes and the like).
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Party to Administrative Proceedings and Legal Interest
The point of departure for considering the nature of a party to
administrative proceedings is Article 28 of the Administrative Procedure
Code. 4 According to that provision, a party is anyone whose legal interest
or obligation is affected by the proceeding or who demands activity by
the administrative body in light of his legal interest or obligation. 5 Article
28 does not constitute a freestanding legal norm because determination
of a legal interest may occur in connection with a norm of substantive
law. The nationalization regulations do not specify who may be a party
to the proceeding, but this gap is filled by the practice of administrative
bodies and the case law of the courts.
According to the position adopted in the legal commentaries,
4F

5F

A party within the meaning of art. 28 will be a natural or legal person
or other organizational unit which under applicable law may or must
obtain specific benefits, or may (or must) be charged with the
obligation to take specific action indicated by the command or
prohibition, but only when they are reduced to an administrative
decision by the administrative body acting within the bounds of its
jurisdiction and competence. 6
6F

4. Ustawa z dnia 14 czerwca 1960 r. Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego [Act of 14
June 1960 Code of Administrative Procedure] (Dz. U. 2017 poz. 1257 t.j.), art. 28 (Pol.).
5. See id.
6. BARBARA ADAMIAK & JANUSZ BORKOWSKI, KODEKS POSTĘPOWANIA
ADMINISTRACYJNEGO. KOMENTARZ [ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE CODE. COMMENTARY] 189
(2009) (Pol.).
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No normative act of administrative law contains a legal definition of
interes prawny (legal interest), and thus determination of its meaning is a
task left to legal literature and case law. 7
It is aptly pointed out in case law that there are no unequivocal rules
or grounds for holding the status of a party or a legal interest under
Article 28 which could automatically be applied in any case seeking a
finding of the invalidity of an administrative decision (in particular a
nationalization decision). This issue should be considered individually
each time, responding to the question of what legal interest or obligation
could be affected by the consequences of potentially finding the decision
in question to be invalid. 8 In its judgment of October 26, 1999, the
Supreme Administrative Court stressed that “a legal interest should be
understood as an objective and actually existing need for legal
protection.” 9 It is also asserted in the case law that the given entity obtains
the status of a party in an administrative proceeding if the set of legal
norms addressing the entity’s legal situation in the administrative
proceeding directly affects the entity’s rights or obligations. 10
The source of legal interest is generally a norm of substantive law,
deriving from any and all fields of substantive law. 11 In civil law
literature, the notion of a legal interest is understood to mean “an
objective, that is truly existing, need for legal protection.” 12 In the
judgment of April 11, 1991, the Supreme Court of Poland held that “a
legal interest should be considered as an objective, that is truly existing,
need for legal protection—this is an interest of a personal nature in that it
is one’s own, individualized and concrete, as well as currently existing.” 13
With respect to an administrative proceeding, “the interest must be
personal, one’s own, individual . . . The interest must be concrete, capable
7F

8F

9F

10F

11F

12F

13F

7. See ANDRZEJ SEBASTIAN DUDA, INTERES PRAWNY W POLSKIM PRAWIE
ADMINISTRACYJNYM [LEGAL INTEREST IN POLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 184 (2008) (Pol.).
8. See Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], II OSK 347/06, Mar.
2, 2007 (Pol.).
9. Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], IV SA 1693/97, Oct. 26,
1999 (Pol.).
10. See Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], I OSK 349/07, Jan.
9, 2008 (Pol.).
11. See WOJCIECH JAKIMOWICZ, PUBLICZNE PRAWA PODMIOTOWE [PUBLIC SUBJECTIVE
RIGHTS] 132 (2002) (Pol.).
12. TADEUSZ ROWIŃSKI, INTERES PRAWNY W PROCESIE CYWILNYM I W POSTĘPOWANIU
NIEPROCESOWYM [LEGAL INTEREST IN CIVIL TRIALS AND NON-ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS] 22
(1971) (Pol.); see also WOJCIECH CHRÓśCIELEWKI & JAN PAWEŁ TARNO, POSTĘPOWANIE
ADMINISTRACYJNE [ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE] 52-54 (1999) (Pol.).
13. Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III ARN 13/91, Apr. 11, 1991 (Pol.).
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of being objectively determined, as well as current and not contingent
. . . .” 14
In administrative law literature, it is stressed that a legal interest is
often accompanied by a third party’s prawo refleksowe (reflexive right),
and this constitutes one of the grounds for the occurrence of a legal
interest. 15
14F

15F

B. “Reflexive Right” Held by a Third Party
A “reflexive right” vested in a third party is tied to a situation where
the primary holder’s subjective right may lead to infringement of norms
of objective law which are not indifferent to the interests of a third party;
thus, a violation justified by the interests of the third party. In particular,
this may involve a situation where the rightsholder demands that the
administrative authority behave in an appropriate manner. 16 Thus, a
reflexive right is connected with the notion of a legal interest, constituting
one of the configurations in which a legal interest may appear. A third
party’s reflexive right arises out of applicable law but is derived from the
legal situation of another entity. Consequently, some commentators take
the view that the lack of a specific legal norm directly concerning the
rights or obligations of a third party excludes infringement of the legal
sphere of the third party and renders any reflex legally indifferent. 17
It is further stressed in case law from administrative courts that a
reflexive right obtains protection only in an administrative proceeding in
which a ruling may be issued that conflicts with the legally protected
interests of a third party by limiting or preventing exercise of the third
party’s rights. As the Supreme Administrative Court held in the judgment
of December 9, 2005:
16F

17F

The characteristics of a legal interest are that it is individual, concrete,
current and objectively verifiable, and its existence is confirmed in the
factual circumstances that are the grounds for application of a
provision of substantive law. An administrative proceeding affects the
legal interest of a specific person when a decision is to be issued in the
proceeding that determines the rights and obligations of the person, or
the determination of the rights and obligations of another entity affects
the person’s rights and obligations. In other words, the status of a party
14. WIT KLONOWIECKI, STRONA W POTĘPOWANIU
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS] 41 (1938) (Pol.).
15. See JAKIMOWICZ, supra note 11, at 137.

ADMINITRACYJNYM [THE PARTY IN

16. See Magdalena Maciołek, O Publicznym Prawie Podmiotowym [On public subjective
rights], 1-2 SAMORZĄD TERYTORIALNY [S.T.] 11 (1992) (Pol.).
17. See WŁADYSŁAW LEOPOLD JAWORSKI, NAUKA PRAWA ADMINISTRACYJNEGO [THE
STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 116 (1924) (Pol.).

FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

12/19/2018 3:02 PM

413

Owners Entitled to Status of Parties?

in an administrative proceeding is held by a person when the person is
directly affected by the proceeding or a ruling may be issued in the
proceeding conflicting with the person’s legally protected interests by
limiting or preventing exercise of the person’s rights. 18
18F

It is recognized in case law and legal literature that there is no barrier
to a legal interest arising also out of civil law. However, as stressed by
the Supreme Administrative Court in the same December 9, 2005
judgment, the body deciding an administrative matter must assess each
time whether the legal interest asserted by the entity of a reflexive
character founded in civil law “actually deserves legal protection.” 19 The
notion of a legal interest should be understood as an objective (i.e.
actually existing) need for legal protection. 20 Involvement in an
administrative proceeding by an entity deriving its legal interest from a
norm of civil law is justified by a threat to any personal or financial goods
of the person. Only in that situation can it be said that the person has a
legal interest. 21 For example:
19F

20F

21F

The owner of neighboring real estate has a legal interest arising out of
Civil Code article 140 to participate as a party (Administrative
Procedure Code article 28) in administrative proceedings as a result of
which a decision may be issued so shaping the relations on the
neighboring property (the manner of its use) that it will affect the
exercise of the right of ownership by the owner of the neighboring
property. 22
2 2F

However, in the case of a proceeding concerning elimination of a
nationalization decision from legal circulation, the property rights of third
parties to the nationalized real estate (e.g. Warsaw Decree property) are
not threatened in any way. The substantive ruling by the administrative
body—whichever way it goes—will not affect the exercise of the right of
ownership or perpetual usufruct of third parties. The reflexive rights of
these persons are not threatened and thus cannot receive protection in
such proceedings because the decision issued in the matter will not
conflict in any way with the legally protected interests of the third parties.
It will not limit or prevent exercise of their property rights to the
18. Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], II OSK 310/05, Dec. 9,
2005, (Pol.).
19. Id.
20. See Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court], VI
SA/Wa 24/06, May 5, 2006 (Pol.).
21. See Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court], IV
SA/Wa 916/06, Oct. 20, 2006 (Pol.).
22. Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], OSK 682/04, Mar. 8,
2005 (Pol.).
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nationalized real estate. Consequently, “any reflex is legally
indifferent.” 23
The rights of such third parties are indisputable and protected by the
warranty of public reliance on the land and mortgage register. Regardless
of the result of the administrative review proceeding, they will not lose
their rights, as was unambiguously confirmed by a resolution of a sevenjudge panel of the Supreme Court of February 15, 2011: “[t]he warranty
of public reliance on the land and mortgage register protects the acquirer
of perpetual usufruct also in the event of defective entry in the land and
mortgage register of the State Treasury or local governmental unit as the
owner of the property.” 24
In the judgment of September 8, 2011, the Supreme Court held that
the principle of reliance on the land and mortgage register also covers the
right of perpetual usufruct. 25 Real estate may change its legal status at a
certain time, but defective action by the State Treasury leading to a
change in that status (in the form of taking over the real estate by, among
other things in the form of nationalization) cannot deprive the perpetual
usufructuary of legal protection even against the owner of the land.
The review body decides as a cassation authority only with respect
to the invalidity of the challenged decision (which occurs due to the
existence of the exhaustively defined grounds set forth in Administrative
Procedure Code Article 156 Section 1), 26 and not as to the essence of the
matter involving whether the nationalization of the given property was
correct. The consequences of the review decision do not exert any direct
legal effect limiting the currently held property right to the real estate.
Such a decision does not give anyone rights to the real estate, and thus it
does not result in any determination of a legal relationship in which third
parties are participants.
As mentioned, in the practice of administrative bodies and in the
case law of the courts, there is a discrepancy with respect to recognizing
third parties holding property rights to nationalized real estate as parties
to review proceedings regarding the nationalization decisions. This
discrepancy is indicated in the passages from the opinions of the
administrative courts cited below.
23F

24F

25F

26F

23.
24.
25.
26.

JAWORSKI, supra note 17, at 116.
Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 90/10, Feb. 15, 2011 (Pol.).
See Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CSK 159/09, Sep. 8, 2011 (Pol.).
See Act of 14 June 1960 Code of Administrative Procedure, art. 156 § 1.
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II. DISCREPANCIES IN ESTABLISHING THE PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS IN
REPRIVATIZATION CASES
A. Position Not Recognizing Third Parties Holding Property Rights to
the Real Estate as Parties to Review Proceedings
In the judgment of September 18, 2014, the Warsaw Administrative
Court held:
[A]dmitting entities who in reliance on the land and mortgage register
obtained rights to the real estate from entities disclosed in the register
to participate in the review proceeding in the matter of finding of the
invalidity of nationalization acts is not justified by Administrative
Procedure Code Article 28, which awards the status of a party
exclusively to entities whose legal interest or obligation is affected by
the proceeding . . . Such status is held in this case only by the company
which owned the nationalized properties, the State Treasury acting via
its statio fisci, and the local governmental unit which obtained rights
to the real estate by way of communalization. Such status is not held
by other entities even though they currently hold property rights to the
real estate. Assuming purely hypothetically that the nationalization
rulings under review were eliminated from legal circulation in the
invalidation proceeding, such a ruling in the case, although exerting
property law effects with respect to the State Treasury, would not
automatically lead to restitution of the lost ownership to the enterprise
(and in principle the appellant company). The subjective rights of the
current owners and perpetual usufructuaries of the real estate,
protected by the warranty of public reliance on the land and mortgage
register, would not be disturbed or in any way limited as a result of a
decision in favor of the former owners in this proceeding. In particular,
issuance of such a decision will not lead to invalidation of the civil
contracts concluded by them on transfer of ownership, establishment
of the right of perpetual usufruct, or sale thereof . . . As regardless of
the substance taken by the review ruling the rights currently held by
entities to the real estate covered in the past by nationalization acts are
not threatened, treatment of such entities as parties to the review
proceeding is unwarranted. 27
27F

Similar conclusions were reached by the Warsaw Administrative Court
in its judgment of February 28, 2014:
The court did not find in the actions of the review authorities a
violation of Administrative Procedure Code Article 28 through
improperly ignoring in the proceeding all entities holding property
27. Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court] I
SAB/Wa 374/14, Sept. 18, 2014 (Pol.).
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rights to the real estate. First and foremost, the rights of these persons,
protected by the warranty of public reliance on the land and mortgage
register, will not be infringed in any way by the substance of the
review ruling issued with respect to the ruling on taking over of the
property for purposes of agricultural reform. Consequently, it should
be accepted that there is no provision of substantive law which would
give rise to a legal interest for such owners (or perpetual
usufructuaries) entitling them to participate in the proceeding as a
party. 28
28 F

In the court’s view, admitting all current owners (or perpetual
usufructuaries) of the real estate as participants in the review proceeding
raises doubts under Article 2 of the Polish Constitution:
[C]onducting proceedings with all owners of plots unconnected to the
matter, and requiring determination in each instance of the current
legal status of such properties, in many situations will postpone for
many years the possibility of redressing the injury done to the original
owners of the real estate unlawfully taken over by the State. In extreme
instances the possibility of concluding the review proceeding under
such conditions would be purely illusory (due to changes in ownership
relations during the course of the proceeding, approvals, the need to
wait for inheritance proceedings to be carried out, and so on). 29
29F

The Warsaw Administrative Court also pointed out in the judgment of
October 7, 2013:
The simple question should be posed what legal effects a potential
finding of the invalidity of the decree ruling would have for the owners
of units, in what manner it could affect the substance of their rights to
their separate unit and the connected share in the real estate. The
administrative proceeding in which the challenged order was issued
concerns a finding of the invalidity of the decision of the Presidium of
the National Council in . . . dated . . . 1950 refusing to award to the
former owners the right of perpetual usufruct to the land . . . covered
by the operation of the [Warsaw Decree] . . . That the decree
proceeding may finally lead to establishment of the right of perpetual
usufruct to a share unconnected to the sold units will only cause a new
person to join the residential cooperative in place of the commune.
However, owners of units, as joint perpetual usufructuaries, have no
28. Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court], I
SA/Wa 1588/13, Feb. 28, 2014 (Pol.).
29. Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court], I
SA/Wa 414/14, Mar. 8, 2005 (Pol.); appeal denied Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme
Administrative Court], I OSK 1330/15, Mar. 17, 2017 (Pol.); accord Wojewódzki Sąd
Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court], I SA/Wa 1821/13, Mar. 12, 2014
(Pol.).
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influence over disposal of that share by the commune. The court finds
no regulation in the Civil Code governing exercise of the right to joint
ownership, or in the Ownership of Units Act, which would create a
legal interest in the owners of the units. A legal interest cannot be
derived from the right of ownership of individual units held by such
persons, joint ownership of common areas of the building, and a share
in the right to the land under the building. 30
30F

B. Position Recognizing Third Parties Holding Property Rights to the
Real Estate as Parties to Review Proceedings
In the judgment of September 23, 2015, the Warsaw Administrative
Court held:
[T]he parties to a proceeding in Warsaw Decree matters are not only
the pre-decree owners or their heirs, but also anyone who holds
property law title to the real estate, and thus the current owners and
perpetual usufructuaries of the real estate . . . The review authority
made an error in interpretation of Administrative Procedure Code
Article 28, as the applicant seeking reconsideration of the case is
entitled to the status of a party. This follows from Civil Code Article
140 §1, which protects to an equal degree the interests of both the
former owners of Warsaw real estate pursuing decree claims, and
persons who later acquired ownership of real estate from the State
Treasury. The legal interest of these persons arising under art. 3(1)–
(2) of the Ownership of Units Act of June 24, 1994 (2000 Dz. U. no.
80 item 903, as amended), as the owners of residential units in the
building on the Warsaw land, became co-owners of a portion of the
building and fixtures and, in a defined fractional share, perpetual
usufructuaries of the Warsaw land involved in this proceeding. 31
31F

A similar position was taken by the Warsaw Administrative Court in the
judgment of May 23, 2012:
It is unquestioned that perpetual usufruct cannot be established on real
estate that is the property of other entities, or on real estate that is held
in undivided joint ownership of the commune and natural persons . . .
It cannot be stated that the perpetual usufructuary does not have a
direct legal interest in a proceeding aimed at a finding of the invalidity
of nationalization decisions, i.e. de facto seeking to defeat the right of
ownership of the real estate held by the State Treasury. The ruling on
this matter has a direct effect on the legal interest of an entity holding
30. Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], I OSK 508/14, May 27,
2015 (Pol.).
31. Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court], I
SA/Wa 3037/14, Sept. 23, 2015 (Pol.).
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the right of perpetual usufruct of the real estate that is the subject of
the proceeding. This is because removing the right of ownership of the
real estate from the State Treasury (or local governmental unit) upsets
the legal construction built on Civil Code Article 232 and in
consequence may lead to removal of the right of perpetual usufruct. 32
32F

In its judgment of July 9, 2015, the Supreme Administrative Court also
adopted this view:
[A]s the subject of this proceeding was oversight, under the review
procedure, of a decision denying the former owner a property right to
land in relation to which (an abstract fraction [idealna część] thereof)
the petitioner holds the very same property right, the position that the
petitioner is not entitled to appear in this proceeding as a party seems
incomprehensible. This right arises under Articles 140 and 233 of the
Civil Code. Under those provisions, within the bounds established by
law and principles of social coexistence, the owner may, to the
exclusion of other persons, use a thing in accordance with the
socioeconomic purpose of his right, and in particular may dispose of
the thing, while within the bounds established by law and principles
of social coexistence and by the agreement delivering land of the State
Treasury or land belonging to local governmental units or unions
thereof in perpetual usufruct, the usufructuary may use the land to the
exclusion of other persons. 33
33F

III. WHY CURRENT OWNERS AND PERPETUAL USUFRUCTUARIES OF
NATIONALIZED REAL ESTATE SHOULD NOT BE TREATED AS PARTIES TO
REPRIVATIZATION PROCEEDINGS
Treating the current owners and perpetual usufructuaries of
nationalized real estate as parties to reprivatization proceedings is one of
the main reasons for the unusual length of these proceedings (often
lasting a decade or more, or even several decades). This practice is
erroneous and also contributes to a negative image of reprivatization
because it generates among such persons a groundless fear of losing their
property.
A legal interest entitling one to be a party to a proceeding (in
particular a reprivatization proceeding) does not depend on an individual
belief that there is a connection between the proceeding and the situation
of the interested person, but instead is of an objective nature and must

32. Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court], IV
SA/Wa 409/12, May 23, 2012 (Pol.).
33. Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], I OSK 2527/14, July 9,
2015, (Pol.).

FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

12/19/2018 3:02 PM

Owners Entitled to Status of Parties?

419

derive from a statutory source. 34 A legal interest derives from a specific
provision of law, directly referring to the entity’s situation. It arises when
there is a connection between the applicable norm of substantive law and
the legal situation of the subject of the law, wherein the act of applying
such a norm may have an influence on the situation of the entity in terms
of substantive law. 35
Because old nationalization decisions issued following World War
II did not rule on acquisition of ownership rights to the real estate by the
current owners (or the right of perpetual usufruct by the current perpetual
usufructuaries), setting aside such decisions (i.e. finding them to be
invalid) does not affect the legal situation of such entities because their
rights to the real estate derive from later acts of civil law (notarial deeds).
Entities cannot be treated as parties to proceedings under
extraordinary procedures, such as invalidating decisions or reopening
proceedings. Reprivatization proceedings are an example of such
extraordinary proceedings since it is obvious that the potential setting
aside of the final decision cannot affect the interests of entities in any
measure. 36 This makes it necessary to reject the requirement of notifying
these entities of such a proceeding. A finding of the invalidity of the
nationalization decision will not cause the original status to be restored,
but will only serve to remove a number of consequences of the decision’s
being in force. Consequently, the result of the reprivatization proceeding
does not directly impact the rights and obligations of the current owners
and perpetual usufructuaries of the real estate, which includes the owners
of separate units in the building located on the former property.
In the judgment of February 11, 2011, the Supreme Court held that
invalidating a decision refusing to award the former owners of Warsaw
land the right of perpetual tenancy or the right to construction on the basis
of Article 7(1) of the Warsaw Decree exerts the legal effect of restoring
to the entitled persons the right to seek the establishment of perpetual
usufruct as a “surrogate” for the no longer existing property rights
provided for in Article 7(1) of the decree. 37 However, it does not exert
the property law effect in the form of restitution of the ownership right to
34F

35F

36F

37F

34. See Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court], I
SA/Wa 58/06, June 13, 2006 (Pol.).
35. See Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], IV SA/Wa 2164/97,
June 2, 1998 (Pol.).
36. See Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], IV SA/Wa 1644/97,
Oct. 5, 1999 (Pol.).
37. See Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], I CSK 288/10, Feb.
11, 2011 (Pol.).
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the buildings located on the land pursuant to Article 5 of the decree. 38
This is because it is not possible for a building that has lost its
separateness, and become an integral part of the real estate, to then
currently be both partly an integral element of the real estate (i.e., with
respect to the shares connected with the sold units) 39 and partly constitute
separate real estate within the meaning of Article 5 of the Warsaw
Decree.
The rights of persons who acquired real estate arising out of the
former nationalized property (e.g. residential units in the building located
on the land) are irrefutable and protected by Article 21(1) of the
Constitution and the warranty of public reliance on the land and mortgage
register (Article 5 of the Act on Land and Mortgage Registers and
Mortgages), 40 and thus the involvement of such persons in reprivatization
proceedings serves no purpose. Regardless of the result of the review
proceeding, these persons will not lose their rights, as unequivocally
confirmed by the resolution of a seven-judge panel of the Supreme Court
in the resolution cited above of February 15, 2011. 41
The notarial deeds under which the current owners and perpetual
usufructuaries acquired rights to the real estate are unassailable. The
establishment of perpetual usufruct or ownership was not the subject of
the challenged nationalization decisions or a result of their issuance or
execution. These rights arose independently of the scope and effects of
the nationalization decisions, 42 which did not contain any determinations
concerning the need to establish the right of perpetual usufruct or the right
of ownership of the real estate.
Issuance of a decision withdrawing from legal circulation the earlier
decision (refusing to award temporary ownership of the land covered by
the operation of the Warsaw Decree) will not lead to an authoritative
determination of the rights and obligations of third parties. The review
body rules as a cassation authority only with respect to the invalidity of
the challenged decision, and not as to the merits of the case involving the
correctness of the nationalization of the property. The review decision
(which concludes the reprivatization proceeding) does not exert any
direct legal effect limiting the property rights currently held to the real
38F

39F

40 F

41 F

42F

38. See id.
39. Ustawa z dnia 24 czerwca 1994 r. o własności lokali [Ownership of Units Act of June 24,
1994] (Dz. U. 2018 poz. 716 t.j.), art. 3(4) (Pol.).
40. See Ustawa o księgach wieczystych i hipotece [Act on Land and Mortgage Registers and
Mortgages] (Dz. U. 2017 poz. 1007 t.j.) (Pol.).
41. See III CZP 90/10, Feb. 15, 2011.
42. See Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court], IV
SA 4470/10, Oct. 5, 1999 (Pol.).
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estate. Such a decision does not give anyone rights to the real estate and
thus its result will not be a concrete determination of a legal relationship
in which the third parties are participants. Such persons (i.e. the current
owners and perpetual usufructuaries of the real estate) therefore have no
legal interest in this proceeding because there is no regulation justifying
such interest.
Entities who acquired rights to the given real estate many years after
issuance of the nationalization decisions have no influence on whether
such decisions, issued over half a century ago, were issued in gross
violation of law. Redress of the old injury cannot at the same time create
either disproportionately greater new injuries to entities who have no
connection to issuance of the unlawful ruling, or a sense of threat to such
persons that they will lose the property they have acquired. Including
such persons (i.e. current owners and perpetual usufructuaries of the real
estate) in the proceeding for a finding of the invalidity of nationalization
decisions would unnecessarily generate a concern among such persons
over potential loss of the properties they have acquired because they are
still protected by the warranty of public reliance on the land and mortgage
register.
Conducting a proceeding often involving dozens or hundreds of
persons whose legal situation cannot change in any way regardless of the
result in the case creates absurd waste and unnecessary confusion for
those persons as well as an obstruction for the applicant. For the
administrative body to involve in the case persons who have no legal
interest in the matter and suspend the proceeding until inheritance matters
involving them are settled, results in practice in the long-term foreclosure
of the path to review of the defective decision under the rules set forth in
the Administrative Procedure Code. Continual prolongation of the
proceeding for this reason and refusal to issue a decision on the merits
should be regarded as a violation of the regulations which established the
principle of expeditious proceedings as well as the rule of law. In
particular, conditioning the resolution of the case on the clarification of
inheritance matters of persons having no connection to the review
proceeding is unacceptable from the point of view of the rule of law.
In light of the foregoing, the party’s right to have the case heard
within a reasonable time under Article 6(1) of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) 43 should also be considered. Conducting a
proceeding with the unnecessary involvement of a large number of
owners and perpetual usufructuaries of real estate significantly prolongs
43F

43. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 6(1) [hereinafter ECHR].
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the administrative review process, often resulting in exceeding the
maximum statutory periods for resolution of matters by administrative
bodies. This also violates the principle of the rule of law (Administrative
Procedure Code Article 6), 44 the principle of deepening of the citizens’
trust in the State, 45 and the principle of expeditious proceedings. 46 As is
often stressed, the grossly long period of consideration of a matter by the
administrative authorities, even when the result of complex
administrative procedures, demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the State,
which violates the citizens’ right to obtain a decision on the matter within
a reasonable time under ECHR Article 6(1). 47 Such lengthy proceedings
conflict with the foundations of the rule of law and undermine citizens’
trust in the legal system and state institutions.
The right to an efficient procedure aimed at quickly obtaining a
resolution, free from delay or inaction of the competent authority of the
State, constitutes an element of a subjective right under public law. 48 It is
an element of procedural justice contained within the clause on the rule
of law set forth in Article 2 of the Polish Constitution. 49 Moreover, this
right is expressly stated in Article 45(1) of the Constitution
(supplemented by Articles 77(2), 78, 173, 177 and 178(1)): “[e]veryone
shall have the right to a fair and public hearing of his case, without undue
delay, before a competent, impartial, and independent court.” 50 Because
the Constitution applies directly unless otherwise provided, 51
Article 45(1) applies also to administrative proceedings. 52
The right to a fair hearing under administrative procedure
regulations is expressed in Administrative Procedure Code Article 12
Section 1, which provides: “[b]odies of the public administration shall act
in a matter thoroughly and expeditiously, using the simplest possible
44F

45F

46F

47F

48F

49F

50F

51F

5 2F

44. See Act of 14 June 1960 Code of Administrative Procedure, art. 6.
45. See id. art. 8.
46. See id. arts. 12 § 1, 35 § 1.
47. See ECHR, supra note 43, art. 6(1).
48. See Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], SK 39/09, Oct. 18, 2011 (Pol.);
Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], S 3/06, Oct. 30, 2006 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy
[Supreme Court], III CZP 152/06, June 27, 2007 (Pol.).
49. See KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [KRP] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 1997,
art. 2 (Pol.); see also Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], SK 2/09, Jan. 12, 2010
(Pol.); see also Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], V SA 250/93, Oct.
10, 1993 (Pol.).
50. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ, art. 45(1).
51. See id. art. 8.
52. Id. art. 45(1); see also PAWEL KORNACKI, SKARGA NA PRZEWLEKŁOŚĆ POSTĘPOWANIA
ADMINISTRACYJNEGO [COMPLAINT FOR OVERLENGTHY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS] (2014)
(Pol.).
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means leading to resolution of the matter,” 53 and Article 35 Section 1,
which provides: “[b]odies of the public administration are required to
resolve matters without undue delay.” 54 These provisions express one of
the fundamental principles of administrative law, alongside the principle
of subsidiarity and proportionality, that is, the principle of efficiency.
This principle requires bodies of the public administration to act
efficaciously, expeditiously, effectively and economically, within the
canon of principles of “proper action” or “good administrative
practice.” 55
The principle of efficiency is one of the foundations for realization
of another basic principle of administrative procedure, i.e. the principle
of deepening citizens’ trust in the state, expressed in Administrative
Procedure Code Article 8: “[b]odies of public administration shall
conduct proceedings in a manner generating trust in public authority on
the part of their participants.” 56 Conducting administrative proceedings
that often last from several years to several decades undoubtedly
undermines this principle.
An essential role in interpreting the substance of the right to an
effective and expeditious proceeding is played by the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg 57 under ECHR Article
6(1) cited above, which provides: “[i]n the determination of his civil
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” 58 As an
international agreement concerning freedoms, rights or obligations of
citizens as specified in the Constitution, 59 pursuant to Article 91(1)–(2)
of the Constitution in connection with Article 241(1), the ECHR
constitutes part of the domestic legal order with precedence over any
statute if it is not reconcilable. 60 Although ECHR Article 6(1) refers
expressly to civil and criminal proceedings, under Article 45(1) of the
53F

54F

55F

56F

57F

58F

59F

60F

53. Act of 14 June 1960 Code of Administrative Procedure, art. 12 § 1.
54. Act of 14 June 1960 Code of Administrative Procedure, art. 35 § 1.
55. See ROBERT SUWAJ, SĄDOWA OCHRONA PRZED BEZCZYNNOŚCIĄ ADMINISTRACJI
PUBLICZNEJ [JUDICIAL PROTECTION AGAINST INACTION BY THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION] (2014);
see also JAN ZIMMERMANN, PRAWO ADMINISTRACYJNE [ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 92 (2010).
56. Act of 14 June 1960 Code of Administrative Procedure, art. 8.
57. On this subject the Constitutional Tribunal directly relies on the standards developed by
the ECHR. See, e.g., Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], SK 10/00, Apr. 2, 2001
(Pol.); Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], P 49/06, Feb. 19, 2008 (Pol.).
58. ECHR, supra note 43, art. 6(1).
59. See KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ, art. 89(1)(2).
60. See id. arts. 91, 241.
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Polish Constitution it also applies in administrative proceedings and is
fundamentally important in shaping them. 61
In Helwig v. Poland, a reprivatization case involving return of an
enterprise nationalized in 1958, the ECHR reiterated that the
reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in light of
the circumstances of the case and with reference to the complexity of the
case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities, and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute. 62 There, the ECHR found
that although the case displayed some degree of complexity, this in itself
did not justify the overall length of the proceedings—nearly fourteen
years. 63 In the court’s view, the circumstances of the case, along with the
overall length of the proceedings, the applicant’s advanced age, and the
importance of the case for the applicant, sufficed for the court to find that
the applicant’s case was not heard within a reasonable time, thus violating
Article 6(1) of the ECHR. 64 In another judgment, Trzaskalska v. Poland,
the ECHR found that one of the reasons for violation of Article 6(1) of
the ECHR was that the deadline for resolution of the case was extended
several times because the authorities were not in a position to complete
the examination of the case within the established times. 65
Under the facts forming the foundation for the ECHR judgment in
Czajkowska v. Poland, which concerned claims for compensation for
nationalized real estate which passed to the ownership of the State
Treasury pursuant to the Warsaw Decree, it took the authorities seventeen
years to calculate and pay compensation to the former owners or their
heirs. 66 The circumstances of the case, and in particular, the grossly long
time it took state bodies to calculate and pay compensation, led the court
to find that “the applicants have already had to bear an excessive burden
which has upset the fair balance that has to be struck between the
demands of the public interest and the protection of the right to peaceful
enjoyment of possessions.” 67 Thus the court held that there was a
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. 68
61F

62F

6 3F

64F

65F

66F

67F

68F

61. See KORNACKI, supra note 52.
62. See Helwig v. Poland, App. No. 33550/02 (2008).
63. See id. ¶¶ 14, 46-47.
64. See id; see also Puchalska v. Polska, App. No. 10392/04 (2009); Wilczyński v. Polska,
App. No. 35760/060 (2008); Derda v. Polska, App. No. 58154/08 (2010).
65. See Trzaskalska v. Poland, App No. 34469/05 (2009) (finding that the case was not
resolved in a reasonable time, lasting over eight years).
66. See Czajkowska v. Poland, App. No.16651/05 (2010).
67. Id. ¶ 62.
68. See id.
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The case law of the Strasbourg court should also be consulted for
interpretation of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, 69 which provides:
69F

Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the
Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a
tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established
by law. 70
70 F

Judicial review of administrative acts is also covered by
Recommendation Rec(2004)20 adopted by the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe on December 15, 2004. 71 In creating standards
for all constitutive aspects of the right to a fair trial, it formulates five
general rules, within which the right to “a fair hearing” includes the
requirement (assessed in light of ECHR case law) that the case should be
decided at the administrative stage (prior to judicial proceedings) within
a reasonable time. 72
71F

72F

IV. LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Reprivatization proceedings for current owners, usufructuaries, and
others who hold property rights to once-nationalized real estate also arise
in other legal systems, particularly in other Central and Eastern European
countries which shared similar historical experiences with Poland.
The solutions adopted in these countries, whether expressly
provided for in regulations or established through administrative and
judicial practice, may be categorized into three groups as follows:

69. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 02. The
charter is regarded as a source of primary EU law. See Monika Lejcyk, System źródeł prawa
unijnego po Traktacie Lizbońskim [System of sources of EU law following the Treaty of Lisbon], 2
REV. OF PUB. L. 78 (2011) (Pol.). See Nina Półtorak, Rozsądny termin postępowania, in KARTA
PRAW PODSTAWOWYCH UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ: KOMENTARZ [EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS: COMMENTARY] 1250-1251 (Andrzej Wróbel ed., 2013), and Andrzej Wróbel, Karta Praw
Podstawowych jako część krajowych porządków prawnych [Charter of Fundamental Rights as a
part of national legal orders], 6 EUROPEJSKI PRZEGLĄD SĄDOWY [E.C.R], 1 (2012), for a more
extensive discussion on the right to effective legal measures, including in the context of
consideration of the case in a reasonable time, guaranteed in this provision.
70. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 69, art. 47.
71. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, RECOMMENDATION REC (2004) 20 OF THE COMMITTEE OF
MINISTERS TO MEMBER STATES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS (2004). https://
eos.cartercenter.org/uploads/document_file/path/61/CoE_Committee_of_Ministers_Rec_2004__2
0__EN.pdf.
72. See KORNACKI, supra note 52.
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1) Property currently held by a third party cannot be the subject of
restitution in kind and therefore such an entity cannot participate in the
proceeding as a party;
2) The current owner of the property may appear as a party to
reprivatization proceedings only if the owner acquired rights to the real
estate in bad faith; and
3) The current owner of the property may join the proceeding as a
party only after demonstrating a legal interest and obtaining the consent
of the body conducting the proceeding, but such person’s rights in the
proceeding are fairly limited.
For example, in Slovakia, under Section 6 of the Act on Restitution
of Ownership of Land of December 2, 2003, ownership of real estate
cannot be restored if the real estate is currently owned by another natural
or legal person. 73 Thus, reprivatization proceedings are not possible if the
former owner of the real estate could be a party. The Act on Change in
Ownership of Land of June 24, 1991 provides an exception to this rule. 74
Under Section 6, it was possible to return real estate to an entity or person
who could participate in the reprivatization proceedings as a party, but
only if the title to the property had been obtained unlawfully (particularly
as a result of unlawful expropriation). However, the filing period to apply
for the return of property under that provision expired at the end of
1992. 75
In Estonia as well, the current owners or usufructuaries of real estate
are not parties to proceedings concerning previously nationalized real
estate. Under Section 12(3) of the Principles of Ownership Reform Act
of June 13, 1991, unlawfully expropriated property is not subject to return
if the property is owned by a natural person in good faith. 76 Similarly,
under Section 6(2) of the Land Reform Act of October 17, 1991, 77 land
is not subject to return if it has been granted in usufruct to another natural
person. Former owners of real estate or their legal successors can only
seek compensation for nationalization of their property, and only they can
73F

74F

75F

76F

77F

73. See Zákon o navrátení vlastníctva k pozemkom ao zmene a doplnení zákona Národnej
rady Slovenskej republiky [Act on Restitution of Ownership of Land of December 2, 2003] (No.
503/2003) (Slovk.).
74. See Zákon o úprave vlastníckych vzťahov k pôde a inému poľnohospodárskemu majetku
[Act on Change in Ownership of Land of June 24, 1991] (No. 229/1991) (Slovk.).
75. See id. § 6.
76. See Eesti Vabariigi omandireformi aluste seadus [Principles of Ownership Reform Act of
June 13, 1991] § 12(3) (RT 1991, 21, 257) (Est.).
77. See Eesti Vabariigi maareformi seadus [Land Reform Act of October 17, 1991] § 6(2) (RT
1991, 34, 426) (Est.).
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be parties to such proceedings. Current owners or usufructuaries do not
qualify as parties.
In Lithuania, the basis for reprivatization is the Law on the
Procedure and Conditions of the Restoration of the Rights of Ownership
to Existing Real Property of June 18, 1991. 78 Under Article 2 of that Act,
the party to reprivatization proceedings is the former owner of real estate
or his legal successors. If it is impossible to return the actual property for
practical or legal reasons, the former owner shall receive financial
compensation. 79 The Act does not provide for the possibility of restitution
of real estate that has been acquired by third parties in good faith. If,
however, the property is occupied by residential tenants, the property may
be restored, and then the party who has regained the property joins the
lease as the landlord. This law was supplemented by the Law on
Restoration of the Rights of Ownership of Citizens to Existing Real
Property of July 1, 1997. 80
In Latvia, until 2004, reprivatization proceedings were conducted
pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Procedure Act of October 14, 1998, 81
which governed participation in proceedings by third parties. Current
owners of real estate could join proceedings as a party only if they
demonstrated a legal interest and the body conducting the proceeding
consented; even then, however, their rights in such proceedings were
fairly limited. Since 2004, reprivatization proceedings have been
conducted under Chapter 28 of the Administrative Procedure Act of
October 25, 2001, 82 which provides rules governing the participation of
third parties in such proceedings similar to the previous rules. A current
owner of real estate may join proceedings as a party only upon
demonstration of a legal interest and with the prior consent of the body
conducting the proceeding. In administrative practice, the authorities
rarely recognize such owners as parties to reprivatization proceedings.
In Ukraine, it was originally impossible to return nationalized
property to the former owners or their legal successors. This was provided
for in the Act on Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression of
78F

79F

80F

81F

82F

78. See Dėl piliečių nuosavybės teisių į išlikusį nekilnojamąjį turtą atstatymo tvarkos ir sąlygų
[Law on the Procedure and Conditions of the Restoration of the Rights of Ownership to Existing
Real Property of June 18, 1991] (No. I-1454) (Lith.).
79. See id. art. 1.
80. See Lietuvos Respublikos piliečių nuosavybės teisių į išlikusį nekilnojamąjį turtą
atkūrimo įstatymas [Law on Restoration of the Rights of Ownership of Citizens to Existing Real
Property of July 1, 1997] (No. VIII-359) (Lith.).
81. See Civilprocesa likums [Civil Procedure Act] (1387/1391) (Lat.).
82. See Administratīvā procesa likums [Administrative Procedure Law] ch. 28 (Latvijas
Vēstnesis, 164 (2551)) (Lat.).
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April 17, 1991, which is no longer in force. 83 Currently, under new
regulations, such a possibility does exist, subject to certain restrictions.
For example, real estate cannot be returned if: (i) it has been acquired by
third parties, (ii) it has been rebuilt at a cost exceeding its original value,
or (iii) it is being used for public purposes (e.g. as a hospital). If real estate
cannot be returned in kind, the former owners or their legal successors
will receive appropriate compensation, and as a rule, the current owners
or users of the real estate are not parties to compensation proceedings.
83F

V. SUMMARY
The issue of the treatment of current owners and usufructuaries of
nationalized real estate as parties to review proceedings is vitally
important for reprivatization. It is one of the main reasons for the great
lengthiness of these proceedings, often lasting a decade or more. This
practice can deprive the former owners of the right to expeditious
resolution of their case and redress of the injury they suffered in the past,
sometimes preventing the case from ever being completed. Moreover,
summoning the current owners and usufructuaries of property to
participate in reprivatization proceedings builds an unfavorable image of
reprivatization proceedings, generating among such persons a groundless
fear of loss of their property. Such a proceeding will at most result in
payment of compensation by the State Treasury or commune to the
previous owners (or their legal successors) and not return of the property,
because such property was effectively acquired by the current owners and
perpetual usufructuaries.
Against this background, a split has developed in the practice of
administrative bodies and the case law of the courts. But it must be
stressed that the rulings recognizing third parties holding property rights
to the real estate as parties to review proceedings are often limited to a
finding that these persons are parties to the administrative proceedings in
question. In these rulings it is typically not explained how the
determination by the administrative body concerning the nationalization
decision could disturb the property rights of third parties to the former
real estate.
In extreme situations, treatment of all the current owners and
perpetual usufructuaries of nationalized real estate as parties to the
proceedings will lead to absurd consequences. An example is the
notorious reprivatization case in the village of Michałowice, near
83. See Pro reabiliatsiyu zhertv politichnikh repressiv na Ukraini [Act on Rehabilitation of
Victims of Political Repression of April 17, 1991] (No. 962-XII) (Ukr.).
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Warsaw, where petitions were filed by 211 people, and the total number
of participants in the proceeding reached 1,467. 84 It is difficult to conduct
proceedings under such conditions. This refers not only to the need to
serve copies of pleadings on such a large number of people and to conduct
hearings with such a large group, but also the risk of constant suspension
of the proceeding due to ownership changes or waiting for inheritance
cases to be conducted. Situations of this type are the very negation of
procedural economy and also stir negative social emotions. Moreover,
the grossly long period for resolving the matter demonstrates the state’s
ineffectiveness, which infringes the citizen’s right to obtain a ruling
within a reasonable time, as provided in the European Convention on
Human Rights.
Entities who have acquired the right of ownership or perpetual
usufruct of real estate many years after issuance of nationalization
decisions have no influence over whether decisions from more than half
a century ago were issued in gross violation of law. In redressing old
losses, disproportionate harm cannot be done to the new owners,
particularly if they had no connection with issuance of the unlawful
decisions.
The problem analyzed here has been effectively resolved in other
legal systems, particularly in neighboring countries with historical
experiences in this area similar to Poland’s. There appears to be no reason
similar methods cannot be applied in Poland. It should be stressed that
these solutions have been implemented in other countries not only via
regulations, but also through administrative and judicial practices.
84F

84. See Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court] I
SA/Wa 493/14, Sept. 21, 2016 (Pol.).

